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The Compensation for Victims of Crime Act of Ontario sets up a way for
the government to compensate persons who suffer losses as a result of
crime.2 This is a desirable objective, but deciding which victims are
deserving of compensation and how much money should be awarded
to them is not a simple task. The Ontario Act accordingly provides that
a board be created to make these difficult decisions and it has been
doing so for over eighteen years.
3
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Criminal Injuries Compen-
sation Board of Ontario. What kind of statutory guidelines does this
administrative tribunal follow when it makes decisions? Does it make
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1. R.S.O. 1980, c. 82, as am. S.O. 1986, c. 37 and c. 64 [hereinafter Ontario Act].
2. The Criminal Code has been amended recently in heed of increasing calls for
victims' rights. Neither these amendments nor the new study of victimology
will be addressed in this article. Among the articles which may be of relevance
in this area are D. Knetch, "Concerns of Canada's Victims' Rights Movement"
(1985) 8 Can. Community L. J. 83; M. Baril, "Canada's First Legislation on
Justice for Victims of Crime" (1987) 4 Justice Rep. 8; D. Davies, "Victims in the
Criminal Justice Process: Providing a Balance in The Administration of
Justice" (1985) 2 Justice Rep 38; M. Karlsen, "Federal Compensation Schemes"
(1988) 4 Admin. LJ. 18; G. Ruygrole, "Reflections of a Victim." (1987) 4 Jus-
tice Rep. 7; and I. Waller, "Victims v. Regina v. Wrongdoer: Justice" (1985) 8
Can. Community LJ. I.
3. The Compensation for Victims of Crime Act came into force on September 1,
1971. It superseded the Law Enforcement Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 237.
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law? Is it prone to any kind of review by the courts? I shall address
these questions in turn and come to a conclusion.
BACKGROUND
Saskatchewan was the first province in Canada to pass criminal in-
juries compensation legislation. Most other provinces in Canada now
have similar legislative schemes.4 In Ontario, the Compensation for Vic-
tims of Crime Act was passed in 1971.
The Saskatchewan and Ontario statutes are modeled on the first such
act in the world, the New Zealand Criminal Injuries Compensation Act,5
which came into force in 1964. In Ontario, there is an important addi-
tional feature to the scheme. Not only may losses be recoverable for
injuries or death sustained as a result of crime,6 but they may also be
recoverable for injuries or death sustained performing or attempting to
perform a citizen's arrest,7 or helping the police in their duties.8
In most Canadian criminal injuries compensation schemes entitlement
to compensation decisions are made by administrative tribunals. The
New Brunswick Act 9 provides for the appointment of a judge from the
Court of Queen's Bench l ° to decide criminal injuries cases. Decisions
4. The following criminal injuries compensation Statutes will be examined in this








Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. C-33
[hereinafter Alberta Act].
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 83
[hereinafter British Columbia Act].
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, C.C.S.M., c. C-305
[hereinafter Manitoba Act].
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, R.S.N. 1970, c. 68.
Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, S.N.S. 1975, c. 68
[hereinafter Nova Scotia Act).
supra, note 1.
Crime Victims Compensation Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. C-47
[hereinafter Saskatchewan Act)
5. Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, New Zealand Statutes 1963, No. 134.
6. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 5 (a).
7. Ibid., note 1, s. 5 (b).
8. Ibia
9. Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-14 [hereinafter
New Brunswick Act].
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of this judge may be appealed under the provisions of the Judicature
Act11 of New Brunswick just as if the judge were sitting in open
court 12 In the Northwest Territories applications for criminal injuries
compensation are heard by judges as well.
13
Before the Ontario Act is examined, some questions need to be
answered. What is the social purpose of criminal injuries compensa-
tion? What role should it play? Opinions on these issues are divided
and run all the way from idealistic to downright cynical. However, it is
possible to classify most ideas concerning criminal injuries compensa-
tion under two heads: the insurance explanation and the moral wor-
thiness explanation. Keep in mind that neither of these explanations
can completely explain any scheme. Members of both schools of ex-
planation start from the assertion that the situation before criminal in-
jury compensation schemes was unsatisfactory.14 Assailants are often
difficult to identify and find, and even when this is done, a civil
remedy is useless if the defendant has no money. The restitution or-
ders that courts may make are not a satisfactory remedy, for the same
reason. As well, in order for a criminal court to make a restitution
order it must first convict, and it may fail to do so for reasons which
seem to have little to do with justice for the victims of crime.15
10. Ibid., s. 5 (1).
11. R.S.N.B. 1973, c. J-2.
12. New Brunswick Act, supra, note 9, s. 14.
13. See Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, S.Y.T. 1975 (1st), c. 10.1, as am.
S.Y.T. 1976 (1st), c. 5; 1980 (2nd), c. 3; 1981 (1st), c. 10, s. 1; 1983, c. 15; 1985, c.
3.
14. A.M. Linden, "Restitution, Compensation for Victims of Crime and Canadian
Criminal Law" in Law Reform Commission of Canada Community Participa-
tion in Sentencing (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1976) 7
[hereinafter Linden].
15. Crime Victims-A Theoretical Assessment of Criminal Injuries Compensation in
Canada (Working Paper No. 6) (Ottawa: Policy Programs and Evaluation, Re-
search and Statistics Section, Policy Planning and Development Branch,
Department of Justice, March 1983) at 11-13 [hereinafter Crime Violence]; and
see P. Bums, Criminal Injuries Compensation: Social Remedy or Political Pallia-
tive for Victims of Crime (Vancouver: Butterworths, 1980) at 19-30 [hereinafter
Burns].
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There are two ways of explaining criminal injuries compensation: by
analogy to insurance or according to the principles of moral blame.
16
A) THE INSURANCE EXPLANATION
Proponents of the insurance school of criminal injuries compensation
point to New Zealand. They argue that the legislature of that country
properly viewed the losses suffered by innocent victims of crime as
being the inevitable consequence of life in modem society.
17
Insurance spreads losses, which is a far more intelligent way of deal-
ing with them than through the courts, in situations where the attach-
ment of blame or fault has no value. It is acknowledged by members
of this school that there is no good theoretical reason for excluding
compensation for lost or damaged property, but that cost dictates that
compensation not be extended to cover these areas.
18
It is claimed by proponents of the insurance school that since in New
Zealand criminal injuries compensation is part of a broader scheme
designed to remove compensation issues from the courts, criminal in-
juries compensation schemes in Canada ought to be seen as part of a
similar movement The analogy to insurance cannot fully explain
criminal injuries compensation, however;, there are better reasons why
people injured while carrying out citizens' arrests or helping the police
should be compensated. As well, the character of the applicant makes
too much difference in the result for just loss distribution to be hap-
pening, as I will show later.
In the system of private insurance contracts, that is contracts between
an insurer and an insured, certain conduct on the part of the insured
can result in denial of coverage by the insurer in the event of a loss.
The nature of such conduct may either be specified by the insurer and
16. Another author replaces the analogy to insurance with a benefit to the state ra-
tionale, adds legal duty to the citizen as an explanation (but not a very convinc-
ing one) and replaces moral blame of the victim with moral duty of the state.
I. Murphy, "Compensation for Victims of Crime: Trends and Outlooks" (1984)
8 Dalhousie LJ. 530 at 534-536 [hereinafter Murphy]. See also Dickson, who
gives as rationales for criminal injuries compensation a state duty to prevent
crime, a state duty to help those in financial need and insurance see B. Dick-
son, "The Forgotten Party-The Victim of Crime" (1984) 18 U.B.C. L.Rev. at 329
[hereinafter Dickson].
17. Report of the Canadian Federal Provincial Task Force on Justice for Victims of
Crime (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1983) at 98 and Lindel, supra,
note 14 at 25.
18. Dickson, supra, note 16 at 329.
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form part of the insurance contract, or be put there as a standard term
because of statute. A term in a property owner's insurance contract
denying coverage for tort claims arising out of bodily injury deliberate-
ly caused by the insured is an example of the first. A term in an
automobile insurance contract as a result of which coverage for bodily
injuries is denied to an insured later convicted of impaired driving is
an example of the second.
To the extent that an insurance based scheme of compensation for the
victims of crime denies entitlement to compensation for the same
reasons that one based on fault or worthiness would, the distinction
between the two systems of explanation that proponents of each try to
make breaks down. However, it should be made clear that insurance
schemes of the sort to which criminal injury compensation schemes
may productively be compared are unlike those created by private
automobile and property owners' insurance contracts. The better com-
parison is to workers' compensation schemes, which are an example of
the kind of global compensation scheme that exists in New Zealand.19
Except in extreme cases, the tests of the law of tort are abandoned as
leading to unjust results. For example, under the Ontario Workers
Compensation Act, compensation may only be denied where "an injury
is attributable solely to the serious and wilful misconduct of the
worker" and then only if it doesn't result in "death or serious disable-
ment" 20 Therefore, proponents of the insurance scheme do not rely on
entitlement arguments based on fault or worthiness.
Insurance-based explanations for compensation are similar to ex-
planations based on fault or worthiness in the area of causation, but
neither kind of explanation is very powerful in this area. Causation is
stated by the editors of Cases on the Canadian Law of Insurance to be
one of the law's thornier patches,21 which is an understatement. It is
relevant to the law of private insurance contracts because a loss must
be caused by a risk insured against and not excluded by the contract
of insurance in order for a payment to be made by the insurer under
the insurance contract Cases involving such contracts take a court
into problems which surround the metaphysics of causation.
19. See Burns, supra note 15 at 131 for an explanation of the New Zealand scheme.
20. Workers'Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 539, s. 3(7).
21. M. Baer & 3. Rendall, eds., Cases on the Canadian Law of Insurance, 3d ed.
(Toronto: Carswell Legal Publications, 1983) at 601.
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These problems require considerable sophistication to solve. One event
may not be caused by a second in the sense that the first event was
going to happen anyway, independently of the second, at some time or
another. Or, to take another example, a completely unexpected and
remote result may only follow a certain act, and not be caused by it.
As a practical matter a private insurer may attempt to deny coverage
on the basis of arguments based upon interpretation of contractual
terms, or some theory of causation different from that advanced by the
insured. This may occur if the insurer can thereby avoid paying a
large sum of money to the insured. It is important to see that situa-
tions such as the above differ from those where a criminal injuries
compensation board is unable to find causation.
As I have shown, courts which scrutinize the denial of coverage by
private insurers often have to consider arguments of considerable sub-
tlety in the areas of contract interpretation and the metaphysics of
causation. This does not appear to be the case in situations involving
the Saskatchewan Board, at least. I shall show in this article that
criminal injuries compensation boards often reduce or deny compen-
sation on the ground of causation.
An examination of the decisions by boards show that a finding that
the applicant caused his or her own injury can only be understood if
causation is used in a very blunt sense. Perhaps this is because it is
difficult to make arguments of subtlety on the basis of statutory terms
which require only that death or injury be the result of a crime. The
concept of causation as it is used in the context of private insurance
may be very different from causation as the term is used in criminal
injuries compensation.
As was earlier implied, it ought to be the aim of criminal injuries com-
pensation schemes to include losses, not to seek to exclude coverage so
as to make a profit. This takes us to the second main explanation for
criminal injuries compensation schemes.
B) THE MORAL WORTHINESS EXPLANATION
Worthiness plays an. important role in the second explanatory scheme
for criminal injuries compensation schemes. Compensation is not a
right; like charity it may be given to those who deserve it. Society is
not attempting to put the innocent victim of crime back in the same
position that he or she was in before the crime took place, rather it is
expressing its sympathy in a monetary fashion to such victims.
(1989) 5 Journal of Law and Social Policy
Later in this article I will develop why I think that the concept of
moral worthiness provides a good way of understanding the decisions
of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board of Ontario, Sas-
katchewan or any other province. In doing so I will not be particularly
original. Most authors have concluded that the insurance explanation
of criminal injuries compensation schemes is not a completely satis-
factory one, - and that moral judgments have a good deal to do with
the Board's decision-making.
Canadian criminal injuries compensation schemes have been the sub-
ject of several excellent journal articles and one books whereas only
authors of articles have examined the legislation of Ontario. 24 Accord-
ingly, it will not be examined independently of the Statutes in other
Canadian provinces. Besides, a comparison of these statutes to the one
in Ontario provides a deeper insight into the rules and principles
which the Ontario Board follows when it makes decisions.
In the pages which follow, I will show how the other provincial legis-
latures have developed aspects of criminal injuries compensation
which flesh out the bones of the Ontario statute. I will explore how the
Ontario Board has adopted many of the ideas made explicit in these
other schemes.
STATUTORY GUIDELINES
All the boards in Canada are given a wide latitude to determine the
kinds of situations in which compensation will be awarded although
some of the statutes provide more guidance than others.25 In Ontario
22. Bums, supra, note 15 at 140; Crime Victims, supra, note 15, at 31-32; and H.
Spiegel, "Practice and Procedure Before the Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board of Ontario" in F. Muskoff, ed., Administrative Tribunals-A Practice Hand-
book for Legal Council (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1989) 265 at 285 [hereinafter
Spiegel]. Mr. Spiegel's article is balanced, well thought out, and very practical.
23. Dickson, supra, note 16; Murphy, supra, note 16; Bums, supra, note 15; and
Carter, infra, note 61.
24. See M. Faieta, "The Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation Board Applications
for Victims of Spousal Assault," (1989) Advocates' Society J. 9 [hereinafter
Faietal; A. Grossman, "Compensation to Victims of Violent Crimes," (1983),
Law Society Special Lectures: Torts in the 80's (Toronto: DeBoo, 1983) 369,
[hereinafter Grossman]; D. Lissaman, "The Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board," (1983) 2:5 Advocates' Society J. 29 [hereinafter Lissamani; D.R. Miers,
"The Ontario Injuries Compensation Scheme" (1974) 24 U.T.LJ. 347 [hereinafter
Miers]; and Spiegel, supra, note 22. Mr. Grossman was Chairperson of the On-
tario Board. Mr. Lissaman, Mr. Speigel and Mr. Faieta have sat on the Board.
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the Board is given the power to exercise discretion in accordance with
the Act with respect to entitlement decisions,2 6 and in Saskatchewan
the Board is given absolute discretion.27 However, the appearance of
the term discretion is not a necessary one, for in all statutes the lan-
guage used in connection with the making of entitlement decisions is
permissive rather than mandatory.
A) RELEVANT FACTORS
All boards are directed to consider relevant factors, which makes dis-
cretion an inevitable part of board decision-making. With one excep-
tion, these relevant factors are always stated to include behaviour
which directly or indirectly contributed to the death or injury of the
applicant for compensation, although the wording differs from statute
to statute.28 In Ontario, the relevant provisions is section 17(2) of the
legislation.29 Court cases in which the decisions of criminal injuries
compensation boards have been either changed or upheld as a result
of judicial review or an appeal provide some guidance as to what is
meant by behaviour which directly or indirectly contributed to the
death or injury of the applicant. For example, in Jewers v.Criminal In-
juries Compensation Board3" a Nova Scotia decision, the applicant for
compensation had assaulted another person, but had received an ab-
solute discharge. When she was subsequently stabbed by the mother of
the other person, her compensation award was reduced by 40 percent.
In Kendi v. Commissioner of Northwest Territories31 Justice De Weerdt of
the Northwest Territories Supreme Court reduced the applicant's com-
pensation award by 25 percent. She had been badly injured in a
motor vehicle accident, but had not been wearing a seatbelt at the
time. Also, she accepted a ride with the driver of the vehicle, although
she knew he had been drinking and taking drugs. Finally, in Poholko
v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board,3 2 a Nova Scotia decision, it
25. Dickson, supra, note 16 at 328-331, and Murphy, supra, note 16 at 542-544.
26. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 5.
27. Saskatchewan Act. supra, note 4, s. 10 (1).
28. In Quebec, compensation will not be granted if the applicant has by his or her
gross fault contributed to his or her injury. Bums, supra, note 15 at 352.
29. Ontario Act, supra, note 1.
30. (1987), 44 D.L.R. (4th) 189 (N.S.S.C. A.D.).,
31. (1985), 1 W.W.R. 284 (N.W.T. S.C.).
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was held that a prostitute who willingly went with a client, and was
subsequently kidnapped and assaulted, did not directly cause these in-
juries by her conduct. More will be said of this case later, when the
topic of moral blameworthiness is discussed, but suffice it to state here
that the victims award was reduced by 50 per cent.
In some cases it may be asserted that "the claimant is the author of
his own misfortune," and compensation is denied. This handy label
can be used to mean that the board in question is not faced with an
innocent victim, but rather a culpable one. Such use by a board is un-
wise, for it implies that the board has employed an all or nothing
analysis, rather than a two step one of the sort to be discussed later.
33
In Re: Manarey and Commissioner of the Northwest Territories,34 another
decision of a Northwest Territories judge, the applicant for criminal
injuries compensation was severely injured when he was kicked in the
head. As a result of the blows he suffered a moderately severe diffuse
brain dysfunction with resulting poor physical co-ordination.35 The
applicant had been assaulted after asking an intoxicated suitor of his
daughter to leave his apartment; he had been drinking too. Given the
seriousness of the beating, the judge found' that the claimant had not
been the "author of his own misfortune" by striking the first blow in
his argument with his daughter's suitor.3 6 The injuries sustained by
the applicant for compensation in Manson37 were less severe. The ap-
plicant had been attempting to break up a fight between two players in
a craps game, one of whom was armed and intoxicated, when he was
shot. He was not found to be entitled to compensation for his bullet
wound.
Dalton v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board was a judicial review of
an Ontario decision. The use of the term "author of her own
misfortune" does not find much support in this decision, which will be
32. (1983), 58 N.S.R. (2d) 15 (N.S.S.C. A.D.) [hereinafter Poholkol.
33. Neither the "author of his own misfortune" nor the "culpability" test were used
by the Divisional Court of Ontario in William Douglas Manson v. Criminal In-
juries Compensation Board (9 January 1989), DC 634/87 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [un-
reported] [hereinafter Manson].
34. (1983), 150 D.L.R.(3d) 358 (N.W.T. S.C.) [hereinafter Manarey].
35. Ibid. at 360.
36. Ibid. at 361.
37. Supra, note 32.
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analyzed in the following paragraphs.38 Such reasoning will not, it is
safe to say, find the favour of the Court. However, in Lischka v.
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board,39 the Ontario Board was sup-
ported in its denial of compensation to an applicant who had struck a
bouncer in a bar after he had been cut off. The bouncer had damaged
his jaw and teeth in return, which the court opined the applicant
ought to have forseen as a probable consequence of such behaviour.
40
In some provinces other than Ontario, the legislatures have been more
explicit, and what may constitute relevant disentitling factors are
spelled out. These may include that the claimant has refused to testify
at a hearing of the board,41 or to submit to a medical examination,4
2
or has failed to provide adequate documentation to the board,43 or to
co-operate with the police in relation to the investigation of the alleged
crime or the prosecution of the alleged offender.44
A feature common to all criminal injury compensation schemes being
studied here are provisions designed, apparently, to encourage people
to further the ends of justice by either stopping suspected offenders or
helping the police to arrest them.45 The awarding of compensation for
injuries or death sustained as a result of this laudable activity is made
possible by sections in the various acts46 although awards under this
head are extremely rare in Ontario. 47 It folldws that compensation
cannot be awarded under these or any other sections if the party
38. (1982), 36 O.R. (2d) 394 (Ont. H.CJ.) [hereinafter Dalton].
39. (1982), 37 O.R. (2d) 134 (Ont. H.CJ.) [hereinafter Lischkal.
40. Ibid. at 136.
41. Alberta Act, supra, note 4, s. 8(2)(d), and Nova Scotia Act, supra, note 4, s.
25(2)(b).
42. Alberta Act, supra, note 4, s. 8(2)(c) and Nova Scotia Act, supra, note 4, s. 25(2)(a).
43. Alberta Act, ibid., s. 8(2)(a).
44. Alberta Act, ibid., s. 8(2)(b). See also New Brunswick Act, supra, note 9.
45. Spiegel, supra, note 22 at 372.
46. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 5(b), (c). For a case in which one such section was
considered see Re: Willier and Crimes Compensation Board (1977), 75 D.L.R. 217
(Alta. CA.).
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claiming compensation as a victim of crime was also a party to the
crime. The party claiming compensation must be an innocent victim.
This idea, which is similar to the equitable maxim that he who comes
to Equity must do so with clean hands, does not find explicit expres-
sion in the Ontario Act. The Statutes of other provinces provide some
interesting approaches to this problem. One expressly denies compen-
sation for injuries arising out of a crime to parties to that crime;48
another denies it to those who colluded with the person committing
the crime or participated in it.49
The chairperson of the Ontario Board states in his analysis of section
17 of the Ontario Act that
"obviously the legislature included these subsections to ensure that
the disbursement of public funds is restricted to proper and deserv-
ing cases."5
0
Under an admirably forthright section of the Manitoba Act the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board of that province is directed to
take into account the character of the applicant and of the victim.
51
This section supports the moral worthiness interpretation of criminal
injuries compensation schemes.
Once again, court cases in which the decisions of criminal injuries
compensation boards have been either changed or upheld as a result
of judicial review provide some guidance as to how courts will react to
disentitlement on grounds of moral blameworthiness. In Dalton52 the
claimant for criminal injuries compensation was pushed out of a
moving van by two men who had picked her up. The court stated:
"Mrs. Dalton was said to be a friendly person," but did not find this
alone sufficient to allow the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board of
Ontario to disallow her claim. However, the court which reviewed an
earlier Board decision in Re: Sheehan and Criminal Injury Compensa-
47. See Lissaman, supra, note 24 at 30. This was advanced as a ground for making
an award in Manson, but rejected by the Divisional Court. Manson, supra, note
33 at 11.48. British Columbia Act, supra, note 4, s. 5(b).
49. Manitoba Act, supra, note 4, s. 6(2)c.
50. Grossman, supra, note 24 at 372 and Ontario Act, supra, note 1.
51. Manitoba Act, supra, note 4, s. lI(l)a.
52. Supra, note 38.
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tion Board53 had supported a decision to deny entitlement on the basis
of who the applicant was. The applicant was a penitentiary inmate,
where he would not have found himself but for his previous conduct
It should be noted that the Ontario legislation has been amended
since the decision in Sheehans4 was handed down. In 1986 the Ontario
Board was given an alternative to granting compensation or denying it
completely; it was allowed to order a reduced amount of compensation
to a victim of crime by an amendment to section 17 of the Ontario
Act.55 Sheehan may no longer represent the law in Ontario.56
It is clear that prostitutes are not primafacie disentitled to criminal in-
juries compensation benefits, by virtue of who they are or what they
happen to be doing. This was the finding of the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court in Poholko v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.57 Indeed, the
court went so far as to adopt the reasoning of the dissenting member
of the Board when he wrote:
"The Board has a responsibility to compensate victims of crime
regardless of the opinion held as to the moral nature of the prac-
tices and conduct of the victim."58
Unfortunately, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has strongly opined
in favour of moral purity in matters involving entitlement to criminal
injuries compensation by supporting the denial of entitlement to a per-
son who had been stabbed in the back while drinking while under age
in a bar. More will be said of Foy v. Crimes Compensation Board59
later. Suffice it to say that where an applicant stands in the socio-
economic scale may dictate entitlement to criminal injuries compensa-
tion. "Deserving" people, to quote the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
in the Foy case, may not drink in certain bars.
The harsh effects of the moral purity or innocent victim rule have
been noted by several authors. Many legal clinic clients who are ap-
53. (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 781, 52 D.L.R. (3d) 728 20, C.C.C. (2d) 167 (Ont. CA.)
[hereinafter Sheehan].
54. Supra, note 53.
55. Supra, note 1.
56. Supra, note 53.
57. Supra, note 32.
58. Ibid. at 20.
59. (1985), 44 Sask. R. 109 (Sask. CA.) [hereinafter Foy].
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plying for compensation lead "less than angelic lives"60 and tend not
to be presidents of the Rotary Club.61 All such applicants do not have
much money.62 Yet the effect of how criminal injuries compensation
boards decide cases,63 and how these cases are viewed by the courts64
may result in such requirements being imposed. Once again, to quote
Murphy,
"... Compensation Boards... often reduce awards at the slightest
hint of victim fault or wrongdoing. The danger in this is that the
victim may be penalized merely for being in the wrong place at the
wrong time with characteristics (wealth, youth, old age, defenceless-
ness, female, a minority) that attract a potential criminal 65
Roger Carter reflected this reality when he commented on the situa-
tion in Saskatchewan subsequent to Foy,6 by stating that
"However, as the law presently stands, before Miss Foy is again
stabbed in the back she would be well advised to take out member-
ship in The Girl Guides."
6 7
It is absolutely crucial to determine when the innocent victim test
should be applied. According to some judges and legal commentators
who have analysed criminal injuries compensation legislation, a two-
step procedure is involved. First, a determination must be made that
the applicant for compensation was injured or killed as a result of a
crime. Second, the innocent victim rule is invoked to determine
whether this compensation ought to be reduced.68 Other judges and
legal commentators have not determined that a two-step procedure is
dictated by criminal injuries compensation legislation and have ap-
60. See Murphy, supra, note 16 at 533.
61. See R. Carter, "Only the Good Deserve Compensation-A comment on R. Ex
Rel Foy v The Crimes Compensation Board of Saskatchewan" (1986-87) 51 Sask. L
Rev. 63 at 65 [hereinafter Carter].
62. See Grossman, supra, note 24 at 369.
63. See the section of this article titled "Does the Board Make Law?", infra, p. 134.
64. See the section of this article titled "Is the Board subject to Judicial Review?",
infra, p. 158.
65. Murphy, supra, note 16 at 533.
66. Supra, note 59.
67. Carter, supra, note 61 at 172.
68. This was the approach of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appeal Division in
Poholko, supra, note 32 at 17. See also Carter, supra, note 61 at 71 for a well-
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plied the innocent victim test right off.69 This point is of sufficient im-
portance to be returned to later in this article.70 Suffice it to state here
that in Ontario the two-step procedure appears to have been im-
posed 71 in some situations involving the police by the legislature when
it amended section 17(2) of the Ontario Act in 1986 to allow the making
of a reduced order for compensation.
In Dalton72 the reviewing court considered the effect of Sheehan.
73 It
was called to make such a consideration by section 17(1) of the On-
tario Act74 which requires the Board to consider all the relevant cir-
cumstances, including the behaviour of the victim that contributed to
the injury, in determining whether to order compensation or to make a
reduced award. The court stated:
"In order to properly invoke this section, the Board must weigh all
the relevant circumstances, it must consider whether any conduct of
the victim directly or indirectly contributed to his injury, and it
must then decide whether to grant compensation, deny compensa-
tion, or whether it will allow a reduced award."
75
The applicability at the above analysis is supported by several decisions
of judges sitting as tribunals at first instance in the Northwest Territories.
In particular, Morrow J., who initially decided Drybones, 6 wrote helpful
decisions in Re Garet and Criminal Injuries Compensation Ordinance77
and Re McDonald,8 in which Re Garet was followed. He stated in Re
Garet that, in a criminal injuries compensation case,
69. This is the approach of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal which overules the Sas-
katchewan Court of Queen's Bench on this point. See the rather brief reasons for
judgment in Foy supra, note 59. See also Grossman, supra, note 24 at 373.
70. See the section of this paper entitled "Is the Board subject to Judicial
Review?", infra, p. 158.
71. Ontario Act, supra, note 1. The Board now has two choices. The first is
whether or not to deny compensation completely. The second is whether or
not, if grounds exist, to grant full or partial compensation.
72. Supra, note 38.
73. Supra, note 53.
74. Supra, note 1.
75. Dalton, supra, note 38 at 397.
76. (1970), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473 (S.C.C.)
77. (1975), 29 C.R.N.S. 391 (N.W.T. S.C.) [hereinafter Garet].
78. (1975), 64 D.L.R. (3d) 757 (N.W.T. S.C.) [hereinafter McDonald].
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"... the victim's behaviour is to be taken into consideration in the
same way as contributory negligence would be applied in the nor-
mal damage action."
79
Finally, the decision in Kendi v Commissioner of Northwest Territories80
is interesting because it expressly rejects an "all or nothing" view of
the consequences of the claimant's conduct.
The Saskatchewan Board is given statutory authority to take into ac-
count the financial needs of the victim or of the dependents of the vic-
tim.81 It is the only Board in Canada expressly given permission to do
so. The first chairperson of the Saskatchewan Board, James Eremko, is
of the opinion that the Board is not thereby empowered to increase an
award for pain and suffering.8 2 It has been argued that inclusion of
this factor makes the statute ambiguous and constitutes a legislative
default,83 but Peter Bums states that the financial need of the ap-
plicant for compensation plays no significant role.
84
B) CRIME REQUIREMENTS
In some situations statute law dictates that compensation for victims
of crime is simply unavailable. This limitation relates to the kinds of
offences for which compensation may be awarded. All of the acts ex-
cept Ontario's contain schedules of offences; a victim of a crime not
listed in these schedules need not waste his or her time applying for
compensation. Most of the offences listed in the schedule to the
various acts seem to involve some form of deliberate physical force, or
threat of it, by manifestly irresponsible behaviour.85The occurrence of
79. Garet, supra, note 77 at 399; and McDonald, supra, note 78.
80. (1985) 1 W.W.R. 284 (N.W.T. S.C.).
81. Saskatchewan Act, supra, note 4, s. 11(b).
82. J. Eremko, "Compensation for Victims of Crime in Saskatchewan" (1969) 19 U.
T. L. J. 263 at 269 [hereinafter Eremko].
83. D. Kirkham, "Compensation for the Victims of Crime" (A paper prepared for
the Institute of Law Research and Reform of the Province of Alberta, 9 Sep-
tember 1968) 52 [unpublishedi [hereinafter Kirkham].
84. Bums, supra, note 15 at 134.
85. Spiegel, supra, note 22 at 271.
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offences for which compensation is claimed need only be proved on
the balance of probabilities, not beyond a reasonable doubt.
86
It is clear that legislatures have empowered criminal injuries compen-
sation boards to avoid some of the difficulties and technicalities of the
common law, as was implied in the second section of this article. The
maximum awards section of the Ontario Act states that the Board may
deem more than one act to be an occurrence where the acts have a
common relationship in time and place,87 thus avoiding some
problems with the common law of causation.
All of the boards are given considerable latitude in their determination
of whether a crime has taken place for the purposes of compensa-
tion.88 For example, every statute allows the board in question to deem
that, if a death or loss occurs, the person causing it had the intent
necessary for a conviction. 89 It has been held that the Ontario Board
has the jurisdiction to conduct a hearing even though the alleged of-
fender has neither been prosecuted for, nor acquitted of the offence
giving rise to the injury or death.90 In Ontario the payment of com-
pensation is expressly not made conditional on whether or not there
has been a conviction.91 In Manitoba there may have been no convic-
tion because the charge was withdrawn or dismissed, but the
Manitoba Board is expressly given authority to deal with applications
86. Grossman, supra, note 24 at 374, Lissaman, supra, note 24 at 31, Spiegel, supra,
note 22 at 272 and Re Castel and Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1978), 89
D.L.R. (3d) 67 (Man. CA.); also see Re: Morris et at and Attorney-Generalfor Neiv
Brunswick (1975), 63 D.L. 337 (N.B. CA).
87. Supra, note 1, s. 19(4).
88. In Spiegel's opinion the legislature of Ontario deliberately granted such
latitude by not requiring the setting out of a schedule of specific Criminal Code
offences which are compensable. Spiegel, supra, note 22 at 271-272.
89. Burns points out that this makes sense because the lack of capacity of an in-
sane person who causes injury or death by committing a crime. He goes on to
state, however, that there are problems when these deeming provisions are ap-
plied to situations involving children, or people in automatous states. Burns,
supra, note 15 at 38.
90. Re Skerget and Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 447 at
448 (Ont. H.CJ.).
91. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 16(1).
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for compensation anyway.92 In one Nova Scotia case it was held that a
criminal acquittal is not conclusive for the purposes of a compensa-
tion application.
93
C) WHAT COMPENSATION MAY BE AWARDED FOR
Claims for only certain kinds of damages may be successfully made to
criminal injury compensation boards. The Ontario Board has power to
award compensation for pain and suffering to innocent victims of
crime,94 as do some other Boards, but the Boards of Manitoba, Alber-
ta, British Columbia and Quebec do not. The parents of a deceased
victim of crime in Nova Scotia were found not to be entitled to com-
pensation for the grief and sorrow they suffered and the trauma and
shock which followed the news of the murder.95 The Ontario Board
has found that it can award compensation for nervous shock but can-
not award compensation for mourning and sorrow.9 6 Drawing the line
between these may amount to an exercise in metaphysics.
In Ontario there is no express authority for the award of compensa-
tion for loss or damage to property.97 However, the Board does have
jurisdiction to award compensation for expenses already incurred as a
result of the victim's injury or death, or those expenses which, in the
Board's opinion it is reasonable to incur.98 Medical bills and funeral
expenses would fall into this category. Peter Burns points out that
every board in Canada has this second power.99 In Ontario, eyeglas-
ses, dental bridges or hairpieces directly damaged or destroyed as a
92. Manitoba Act, supra, note 4, s. 6(15).
93. Flynn and Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1988), 49 D.L.R. (4th) 619
(N.S.S.C. A.D.) overruling Saubier v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board
(1984), 62 N.S.R. (2d) 266.
94. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 7(l)(d).
95. Dixon v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1985), 79 N.S.R. (2d) 85 (N.S.S.C.
A.D).
96. Files numbered 200-157 and 100-84 referred to in Grossman, supra, note 24 at
381-382. See also Spiegel, supra, note 22 at 275.
97. Nor is there such authority in the legislation of any other province. This is be-
cause compensation for these losses would cost too much, according to Dick-
son. Dickson, supra, note 16 at 328-331.
98. Ontario Act. supra, note 1, s. 7(l)(O.
99. Burns, supra, note 15 at 25.
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result of crime are seen as extensions of the person and therefore as
allowable expenses.1I 0 The situation in Canada with respect to expen-
ses to be incurred is quite complicated, and little benefit would result
from summarizing it here.
101
A Board may refuse to make, or reduce, an award of compensation if
the applicant has failed to promptly report to the police the act or
omission resulting in the injury in Ontario or failed to reasonably co-
operate with them.102 The Ontario Act also contains a provision dictat-
ing that an application for compensation must be made within one
year after the injury or death. 13 All of the statutes contain such
limitation periods, unlike workers' compensation schemes.
A rule against double recovery also finds expression in the Ontario
Act.1 4 A past chairperson of the Ontario Board has stated rather
starchly that the Board does not duplicate payments of any kind, but
since 1986 the Board has been forbidden from counting welfare assis-
tance and family benefits payments. 10 5 A person who has already
received compensation for an injury or loss will not be compensated
again by a criminal injuries compensation board, 106 and benefits may
not be stacked with those from other social welfare schemes.10 7
As an illustration of this rule, several statutes; other than Ontario's,
prohibit the payment of an award to a member of a police force who
has been injured while in the course of duty if that person is already
receiving compensation for these injuries from the police purse.108 To
quote Chief Justice Dickson, criminal injuries compensation is
100. Speigel, supra, note 22 at 273.
101. See Manarey, supra, note 34.
102. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 17(2).
103. Ibid., 1, s. 6; also see Re Darling and The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board
(1976), 11 O. (2d) 766 (Ont H.CJ.) [hereinafter Darling].
104. Supra, note 1, s. 17(3); see Re Fregeau and Crimes Injuries Compensation Board
(1973), 2 O. 182 at 184. (Ont H.CJ.). [hereinafter Fregeau].
105. Grossman, supra, note 24 at 372; see Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 17(3).
106. For a good summary of the situation in Ontario, see Spiegel, supra, note 22 at
279.
107. see, however, Re: Koyina (1986), 6 W.W.R. 205 (N.W.T. S.C.).
108. See Nova Scotia Ac4 supra, note 4, s. 6(2).
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designed to be the last insurer: other sources of compensation reduce
awards.109
Criminal injuries compensation boards are always subrogated to ap-
plicants when the parties responsible for causing the death or injury
are sued, 110 although one court has defined the party responsible
rather narrowly. 111 The Manitoba Board is even empowered to require
the repayment of compensation if the recipient of it fails to bring an
action against the person who caused the loss or death in question.
112
It is more common for the claimant to be required to co-operate with
the board if it does so, 113 but not to have to sue the offender him or
herself.1
14
The Ontario Act does not require a victim of crime who receives com-
pensation to sue, but section 25(4)115 requires a person to whom com-
pensation has been paid to notify the Board of the institution of an
action for damages. The Board may be entitled to recover some of the
money it has paid out if the action is successful. 116
It has been implied throughout this summary that all statutes allow
compensation payments to be made to the dependents of deceased vic-
tims of crime. As might be expected, the definition of dependent varies
from statute to statute. In Ontario the definition of dependant is quite
broad.117
It is usual for there to be limits on the monetary value of compensa-
tion that can be awarded, both for lump sum and periodic pay-
109. Dickson, supra, note 16 at 330.
110. For example, Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 26(2), (2a).
111. see Saskatchewan (Attorney General) v. Muirhead (1987), 59 Sask. R. 8 (Sask.
Q.B).
112. Manitoba Act, supra, note 4, s. 18.
113. As is the case in Ontario, Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 26(5).
114. Abid., s. 17(2); see also Alberta Act, supra, note 4, s. 14 (c)(1).
115. Ontario Act, supra, note 1.
116. see Berlingieri v. De Santis (1980), 31 O.R. (2d) 1 (Ont. CA.) and Criminal In-
juries Compensation Board v. Ditroi (1975), 8 O.R. (2d) 133 (Ont. CA).
117. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. I (1)(c), see Spiegel, supra, note 22 at 281.
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ments.118 These limits, which were greatly increased in 1986, are set
out in section 19 of the Ontario Act.
I) The amount awarded by the Board to be paid in respect of the
injury or death of one victim shall not exceed, (a) in the case
of lump sum payments, $25,000; and (b) in the case of periodic
payments, $1,000 per month, and where both lump sum and
periodic payments are awarded, the lump sum shall not exceed
half of the maximum therefor prescribed in clause (a).
2) The total amount awarded by the Board to be paid to all ap-
plicants in respect of any one occurrence shall not exceed, (a)
in the case of lump sum payments, a total of $150,000; and (b)
in the case of periodic payments, a total of $250,000.119
They do not apply when a person is victimized as a voluntary act of
good citizenship.120 No less a person than the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Canada has opined that such statutory limits on
compensation can be harsh on individual victims.
121
D) THE MAKING OF ENTITLEMENT DECISIONS
In all of the Acts studied here provision is made for the -making of en-
titlement decisions by boards. In Ontario, a decision may be made by
a Board composed only of one person122 and on the basis of
documentary evidence only,123 but an applicant has a right to a viva
voce hearing.124 At this hearing an applicant has the right to cross examine
any police force members who testify against him or her, but not the sources
relied upon by those members.125 Great weight must be placed upon the tes-
timony of police officers, 126 even if it is hearsay. 127 Viva voce hearings
118. See Spiegel, supra, note 22 at 276.
119. Supra, note 1.
120. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 19(5); see also Grossman, supra, note 24 at 381.
121. Dickson, supra, note 16 at 330.
122. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 8(b).
123. Grossman, supra, note 24, at 376 referring to the Statutory Powers Procedure Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 484, s. 4.
124. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, ss. 9-10.
125. Lischka, supra, note 39.
126. Batic v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1987), 1 OA.C. 68 (Ont. Div. Ct.)
[hereinafter Batic].
127. Lischka, supra, note 39 at 135.
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are always held in rape and child abuse cases in Ontario. 128 In British
Columbia, Manitoba. and Quebec decisions are made by workers com-
pensation boards, and not necessarily by way of a viva voce hearing.
129
One member of a Board is allowed to hold an entitlement hearing in
several jurisdictions, including Ontario, but a quorum of the Board
has to be present to review an entitlement decision.130 Hearings are
usually open to the public in Ontario.131 The rules of procedure to be
followed by the Ontario Board are set out in the Statutory Powers Proce-
dure Act.132 No Board practice rules have been filed under the Ontario
Act, which seems typical133 and there are very few cases in which how
such hearings ought to be run are considered.134
In Manitoba and Alberta there is a requirement that one member of
the Board have legal training,135 but there is no such requirement in
Ontario or Saskatchewan. None of the members of the Ontario
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board were practising lawyers in
1988.136 In Lischka137 the Ontario High Court of Justice stated
"The Board is made up of persons who are not legally trained and
I think it is unfair to the members of that Board and to the spirit of
this legislation to subject their reasons for judgment to the nice
scrutiny to which reasons for judgments of judges are properly sub-
jected."
At least one member of the Board is a lawyer in Saskatchewan. 138
128. Lissaman, supra, note 24 at 31.
129. Grossman, supra, note 24 at 375.
130. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, ss. 8-10.
131. Ibid., s. 12.
132. Supra, note 123.
133. My library search for such regulations made under the various statutes was
fruitless. Ontario Act, supra, note 1.
134. One case is Jewers v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1987) 44 D.L.R. (4th)
188. (N.S.S.C. A.D.). See, however, Spiegel's excellent article. Spiegel, supra, note
22.
135. Alberta Act, supra, note 4, s. 20(3) and Manitoba Act, supra, note 4, s. 2(3).
136. Spiegel, supra, note 22 at 270.
137. Lischka, supra, note 39 at 135.
138. The first chairperson of the Board, William Eremko, was a lawyer as is the
present chairperson, Morris Chemesky, Q.C.
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E) THE POSSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
I have examined some of the statutory guidelines applicable to the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board of Ontario, using the criminal
injuries compensation statutes of other provinces as reference points
for the further development of these guidelines. This brings me to the
last subject of this brief comparative analysis, and one of the most im-
portant ones for the purpose of this article, judicial review. To what
extent do the various statutes allow it to take place?
The legislature which passed Ontario's Compensation for Victims of
Crime Act apparently tried to create a scheme relatively immune from
judicial interference. The only grounds for review of a Board decision
in Ontario, 139 British Columbia, 140 and Nova Scotia141 are questions
of law. Both questions of law and questions of jurisdiction are made
proper subjects of judicial review by the sections in the criminal in-
juries compensation statutes of Alberta 142 and Manitoba.143
In Saskatchewan, judicial review of a Board decision is made difficult.
Section 33(1) of the Saskatchewan Act1 44 states that, with one exception
that is of no consequence to us here,
... there shall be no appeal from an order or decision of the board
under this Act and its proceedings, orders and decisions shall not
be reviewable by any court of law or by certiorari, mandamus,
prohibition, injunction, or other prohibition.
Only Newfoundland has a similar privative clause.145 In Quebec ap-
plications for judicial review are rare, and they are treated as if they
originated from decisions of that province's workers compensation
board. 146
139. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 23.
140. British Columbia Act, supra, note 4, s. 18(1).
141. Nova Scotia Act, supra, note 4, s. 24.
142. Alberta Ac4 supra, note 4, s. 18(1).
143. Manitoba Act. supra, note 4, s. 21(1).
144. Supra, note 4.
145. Newfoundland Act, supra, note 4, s. 36(1).
146. Bums, supra, note 15 at 387.
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DOES THE BOARD MAKE LAW?
In this part of the article I shall examine some of the entitlement
decisions made by the Saskatchewan Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board. It will be assumed that the Saskatchewan decisions are similar
to those made in Ontario. I shall utilize some of the summaries of
decisions contained in a draft of the Saskatchewan Board's 1984 An-
nual Report, 147 will begin by examining the ninety-one decisions
which the Board has issued in the period from the beginning of 1984
to the middle of September 1984.
This examination will be conducted with two questions in mind.
First, does the Board decide like cases in the same way? Second, has
the Board developed the exercise of its discretion into any fixed rules
or principles?
An examination of Saskatchewan decisions rather than Ontario ones
has several advantages for my purposes. The most important is
manageability, as in any given year many more Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board decisions are made in Ontario than in Sas-
katchewan. 148 Also, the full Saskatchewan decisions were available to
me.
Studying these decisions has more academic value than examining the
summaries of them which are produced by the Saskatchewan
Board.149 Spiegel, who used to sit on the Board, does not find the par-
ticulars of decisions contained in the Board's Annual Reports to be of
147. It covers decisions made during the period from April 1, 1983 to March 31,
1984: Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of Saskatchewan Fiscal Year End Report
April 1, 1983-March 31, 1984, (Saskatchewan, Department of Justice, 1984)
[hereinafter Report].
148. The Ontario Board made 970 awards from April 1, 1983 to March 31, 1984.
This compares with 91 cases in the period being examined. See The Fifteenth
Report of the Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for the fiscal year April
1, 1983 to March 31. 1984 (Toronto: Criminal Injuries Compensation Board,
1984) 1 at 12.
149. The Ontario Board is obligated to summarize and publish its decisions peri-
odically (Ontario Act, supra, note I, s. 4). The Saskatchewan Board also does so
in its annual reports. The way that decisions are organized and summarized in
these reports makes extracting the meaning difficult. Discovering governing
principles, except that the people in the cheap seats do not get a very expensive
version of the justice show, is rather like trying to learn the Civil Code of
California by watching a month of Judge Wapner on People's Court (Rochester,
Channel 13-R, 5:30 p.m, Max Edwards Productions, Lorimar Pictures)
[hereinafter People's Court.] There are plans to revamp the Annual Reports of
the Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.
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much value in assisting counsel as to the quantum of awards.150 Miers
has examined the decisions of the Ontario Board, but some time
ago,151 and Faieta has looked at those which involve spousal as-
sault.152 Finally, a brief survey of the summarized decisions and con-
tained in the Board's annual reports153 has been made by another
author. Murphy states that the Ontario Board has reduced or denied
claims for compensation because of the illegal, immoral or imprudent
behaviour of the claimant, as defined by the Board members themsel-
ves.154 He lists as open ended the category of instances where this has
occurred. The reasons for doing so include
"failing to report to the police within a reasonable time, participa-
tion in criminal conduct, membership in the underworld,
homosexuality, drunkness, family disputes, immoral conduct im-
prudent behaviour." 155
This view of how the Ontario Board has decided cases is shared by
Spiegel, 156 but he is somewhat more optimistic concerning what the
future will bring. He is of the opinion that the Board's many new
members may well take a more liberal or forgiving view of human na-
ture in how they apply this section 170.157 It seems only fair to give the
Ontario Board a chance in the light of other indications in this direc-
tion.
Roger Carter's rather tart comment that no distinct body of
jurisprudence has developed around the decisions of the Sas-
katchewan Criminal Injuries Compensation Board must always be
kept in mind.158 In a sense such decisions may always be derivative as
the lay members of the Board struggle to reflect what is going on in
150. Spiegel, supra, note 22 at 282.
151. Miers, supra, note 24.
152. Faieta, supra, note 24.
153. Murphy, supra, note 16 at 544.
154. Ibid. at 544-545.
155. Ibid. at 545.
156. See Spiegel, supra, note 22 at 286.
157. Ibid. at 289.
158. Carter, supra, note 61 at 170.
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the law of tort. The situation in Ontario is similar as was indicated by
Galligan in Lischka159 when he stated:
"I think it should be kept in mind that these cases are not ones in
which the court is assessing various degrees of civil liability for cer-
tain damages. The Board by its statute is obliged to consider,
having regard to all of the circumstances, whether it is an ap-
propriate case for somebody who is injured to be compensated out
of public funds."
Also, speed of decision-making may be more important to the drafters
of Ontario's criminal injuries compensation legislation than purity of
legal doctrine. Certain compromises are necessary if four applications
for compensation are to be heard every hearing day,16° or if only an
hour is allocated to a hearing.161 One is reminded again of People's
Court.162
Some flavor of the jurisprudence which has developed under the On-
tario statute is given in the following quotation from Grossman, a past
chair of the Board
"Drunks are easy marks for muggers" and we take the view that it
is asking for trouble to stagger through the streets at night "under
the influence." If the applicant engaged voluntarily in a free fight
we may even reject the claim. Where the applicant began on equal
terms and one participant pulled a knife, a reduced award could be
made."163
It is interesting to note the importance of alcohol and fighting in this
account; the two go together in some taverns.
With this in mind it is time to return to an analysis of the decisions of
the Saskatchewan Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.
159. Lischka, supra, note 39 at 136.
160. Grossman, supra, note 24 at 380.
161. As happens when the case is not disputed. See Lissaman, supra, note 24 at 31.
Sometimes, if a case is disputed, an entire day will be set aside.
162. People's Court, supra, note 149. A case takes 15 minutes in this court, although
some editing is done.
163. Grossman, supra, note 24 at 375.
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A) ARE LIKE CASES DECIDED IN THE SAME WAY?
At first glance, Board compensation awards for pain and suffering in
Saskatchewan seem easily classifiable according to the offences lead-
ing to the various types of physical injury for which a loss is claimed.
Awards for pain and suffering were chosen because they are supported
by more facts in the decisions of the Saskatchewan Board than, for ex-
ample, claims for expenses 164 They are also more interesting to study.
If the cases which do not involve some disentitling factor on the part
of the applicant are organized under the heading of a particular kind
of physical injury, such as a broken arm, then it would seem quite
easy to determine whether the Board decides like cases in the same
way. However, the facts conspire to make such a simple comparison
difficult, as it is relatively unusual for an applicant to be suffering
from just one injury. Also, care must be taken to select decisions in
which the applicant was seen to be entirely free from blame.
What used to be called rape165 provides a good vehicle for overcoming
these two obstacles to comparison of decisions. If the victim was very
young and a relative stranger to her assailant, then the Board's entitle-
ment decision cannot be thought to be influenced by any concept of
blame. Furthermore, since according to the law of tort physical injury
is not a prerequisite for a damage award, similar offences can be com-
pared without having to worry about how they resulted in different
physical injuries. This may be possible if the act was not accompanied
by much physical violence. Of course, this approach may assume
away the problem, because it assumes that the emotional damage
caused by such an act is the same whoever the victim.166
The question of appropriate compensation for victims of sexual as-
sault was considered in six of the ninety-one cases in the period being
164. Cases summarized in the Board's draft 1984-1985 annual report contain no ex-
planation of what compensation was awarded for, other than pain and suffer-
ing. Report, supra, note 147.
165. It is now aggravated sexual assault. See Ctiminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s.
273.
166. Emotional damage of this sort would be largely uncompensated were it is not
for criminal injuries compensation schemes. This is recognized by several
authors. See, for example, Dickson, supra, note 16 at 331 and Grossman, supra,
note 24 at 381-382.
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examined. In case 1193 the Board reduced its award because of her as-
sociation with strangers, so it will not be considered here. In three out
of the five remaining decisions all of the conditions set out in the
above paragraph were met. The fifteen-year-old girl who was sexually
assaulted by her employer in case 1125 was awarded $2,750 for pain
and suffering. The seventeen-year-old who was sexually assaulted by
her cousin in case 1137 was awarded $4,300, whereas the twelve year
old who was assaulted sexually by her friend's father in case 1176 was
awarded $2,900. Physical violence was not reported to be present in
any of these cases, although threats or intimidation were involved in
all of them. The very terse reasons for decision given by the Board in-
dicate that, in two cases, psychiatric help was sought by the victims;
that they all suffered severe emotional trauma is obvious.
If the fact that the person in case 1137 had to have a therapeutic abor-
tion, which procedure could have involved even more emotional dif-
ficulties is taken into account, perhaps we can say that the Board does
decide like cases in the same way. Certainly there is not much dif-
ference between $2,750 and $2,900. However, as is the case with courts,
the Board can only be taken to set down a range within which the
damages awarded in similar cases will fall. This point is illustrated by
the two Board decisions which follow.
In case 1119 an eighty-seven year old woman was attacked by a man
who tried to rape her. In the struggle which ensued five of her ribs
were fractured and she was badly bruised. The Board stated that this
woman was in hospital for eighteen days as a result of the attack and
suffered severe emotional trauma. It gave her $2,750 for pain and suf-
fering. Yet in case 1193, the one mentioned earlier in which the award
was decreased because of the applicant's conduct, $3,200 was awarded
for pain and suffering after the decrease. Here the applicant's only
physical injuries were scrapes and abrasions to her back, legs and but-
tocks.
The Saskatchewan Board decisions in the relevant period contain four
examples of people who were assaulted by being hit in the face. In all
of these cases provocation appears to have been lacking. It is difficult
to make a comparison of awards for pain and suffering in these cases
without knowing how serious and disfiguring these injuries were, and
nothing short of pictures would provide this sort of information, but a
comparison of awards will be made anyway. Certainly the draft an-
nual report is very terse in respect to the description of injuries which
it gives.
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In all of the cases being examined the injuries sustained went beyond
bruises, but there were no bones broken, with the exception of teeth in
two cases. The lacerations sustained by the victim were probably the
most severe in case 977, where the award was $1,750. The face, temple,
and the right side of the applicant's neck were cut as a result of being
struck with a beer bottle. The same weapon was used in case 992, but
apparently with much less damaging results. The applicant was
awarded damages of $800; she suffered lacerations to her lips, bruises
to her mouth, and two fractured teeth. In case 980 the applicant sus-
tained bruises and lacerations to his face and chipped an incisor, the
Board gave him $750. Finally, an identical amount was given to the
applicant in case 985 who was being compensated for lacerations to
his lips and severe bruising to his gums.
Subject to the reservations expressed earlier, at least three of these
awards for head injuries seem to be quite consistent with each other.
Perhaps they all are. It appears that the Board has some kind of inter-
nal schedule dictating how much money it will award for certain in-
juries. In some workers compensation schemes this schedule finds
explicit expression. Such a schedule exists, of course, under the On-
tario legislation, 167 although its abolition is now being seriously
proposed. Abolishing this way of thinking will be more difficult.
That the Saskatchewan Board does take precedent into account in the
sense of paying some attention to damage awards made by courts is
suggested by the presence of an apparently up-to-date Goldsmith's
Damages For Personal Injury and Death in Canada 1982-1983.168 in the
Saskatoon office of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. There
exists a sophisticated statistical breakdown of the awards of the On-
tario Board made in 1980, organized by type of injury. So the Board
does attempt to decide like cases in the same way, and an examination
of its decisions indicates the achievement of some degree of success.
Grossman indicates that the Ontario Board attempts to do the same
through the development and maintenance of an internally available
"meat chart."169 Lissaman, who sat on the Ontario Board for a num-
167. Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 539, s. 45(3) states that: "The
Board may compile a rating schedule of percentages of impairment... that
may be used as a guide in determining the compensation payable in per-
manent disability cases."
168. R.C. Stonehouse, ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1983).
169. Grossman, supra, note 24 at 381.
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ber of years, states that the Board's awards are perhaps forty percent
of court awards in similar cases.
170
B) HAS THE BOARD DEVELOPED THE EXERCISE OF ITS
DISCRETION INTO ANY FIXED RULES OR PRINCIPLES?
The more difficult to answer of the two questions posed at the begin-
ning of this section is the second one. Has the Saskatchewan Board
developed the exercise of its discretion into any fixed rules or prin-
ciples? Discovering them may help to explain what the Board does in
a way which even careful scrutiny of its empowering statute does not.
It is with this question in mind that I once again turn to the decisions
of the Saskatchewan Board.
171
In 1984 the Saskatchewan Board denied compensation completely in
only about twenty percent of the cases which came before it, and
awarded only a fraction of the compensation that would otherwise be
available in about a further ten percent of the cases it heard. 172 These
figures went down to nine and one percent respectively in the Board's
1987 fiscal year.173 In Ontario four percent of all applications heard in
the Board's 1984 fiscal year were heard but denied. 174 There is no ap-
plications reduced category in the statistical summary contained in the
Ontario Board's 1984 Annual Fiscal Year-End Report.
175
The above may be a misleading picture of the percentage of applica-
tions which the Board disallows in or in part, because some people are
probably discouraged from even applying for compensation by Board
170. Lissaman, supra, note 24 at 30.
171. Contrary to what Grossman implies, the brief summaries of the decisions of
the Ontario Board are not very helpful in this regard. See Grossman, supra,
note 24 at 380.
172. These calculations were performed with figures provided by an examination of
the 91 decisions the Saskatchewan Board handed down during the period from
the beginning of 1984 to the middle of September 1984. The Board denied
compensation totally in 19 cases, and partially in a further 10. Unfortunately,
the Board's 1984 draft annual report did not permit the extraction of this kind
of information. See Report, supra, note 147.
173. Criminal Injuries Compensation Act of Saskatchewan Fiscal Year End Report April
1, 1987 to March 1, 1988 (Saskatchewan, Department of Justice, 1988) at 6.
174. The Fifteenth Annual Report of the Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board, supra, note 148.
175. Ibid.
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employees, but it is the best picture available. Two principles emerge
when this picture is examined.
(i) The Tavern Principle
My examination of the cases where the Board denied compensation
completely shows that the most common reasons given for doing so
were intoxication of the claimant, that the claimant provoked or in-
itiated the injury complained of, or that there was insufficient evidence
that the claimant was the victim of a crime. It is not useful to see these
as self-contained alternative categories, for when the board gives the
second as a reason for its refusal to award compensation, often the
third seems equally applicable. It may be unclear to the Board
whether or not a crime occurred, let alone whether or not the ap-
plicant committed it. The majority of the denied claims involve situa-
tions where the applicant was intoxicated and either provoked or
caused the injury which he or she sustained, or was unable to show
otherwise. In short, to make a connection with the worthiness rationale
for criminal injuries compensation schemes, the victim was to blame
for his or her misforture.
This leads me to pose the "tavern principle" of entitlement to compen-
sation. I call it that because the principle seems to find strongest ap-
plication to applications for compensation arising out of altercations
in taverns. 176 It is
people will not be awarded compensation for injuries sustained
when intoxicated, which injuries are alleged to be the result of
crime, because it will be too unclear to the Board how the injuries
were caused, and it will be too difficult for the claimant to show
that his or her conduct didn't cause the injuries.rn
This principle is not expressed in any of the statutes which were ex-
amined in the third part of this article, although it may be implicit to
some of them.
The Board gives other reasons for denying benefits, but they appear
less frequently. The most common of these arise from the failure of an
applicant to co-operate with either the medical authorities or the
176. For an Ontario case in which this principle could have been applied with the
same result as was arrived at by the court to which the appeal in question was
taken, see Lischka, supra, note 39.
177. The decisions made according to this principle are somewhat similar to the
ones listed under "Denial of Awards" by Spiegel in his review or the Ontario
Board's jurisprudence. Spiegel, supra, note 22 at 285.
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police. Failure to co-operate with medical authorities will be ex-
amined first
Case 1084 contains the idea that an applicant's failure to follow medi-
cal advice after an injury indicates that the injury complained of can-
not have been very serious in the sense of being painful. Case 1096
involves a person whose injuries may have been aggravated by her
lack of concern; they were not entirely caused by crime. Perhaps both
cases are explained by a variant of the worthiness rule: people who
don't look after themselves don't deserve as much compensation. Par-
tial rather than total denial of compensation is involved here, but the
reasoning behind the entitlement decision is no doubt the same in
both cases.
I have shown that the criminal injury compensation statutes of Alber-
ta178 and Nova Scotia179 expressly make the failure to submit to a
medical examination a reason for the denial of benefits, and that this
is not the case in either Saskatchewan or Ontario. However, in both of
these provinces this sort of behaviour can certainly be taken account
of as behaviour directly or indirectly contributing to the death or in-
jury of the victim.180
Failure to co-operate with the police is a reason for denial of benefits
which takes in a lot of ground. It has earlier been shown that the Sas-
katchewan Act gives the board clear authority to deny compensation
where the victim has failed to report the act or omission resulting in
death or injury to the police within a reasonable time.181 The Ontario
Act requires such a report to be made promptly.182 The Saskatchewan
Board denied compensation for this reason in case 1092; there was
also some doubt that an offence had been committed.
The Saskatchewan Board tends to discount the possibility of retalia-
tion as a result of an applicant for compensation laying charges
against his or her assailant It was earlier noted that failure to assist in
178. Alberta Act, supra, note 4, s. 8(2)(c).
179. Nova Scotia Act, supra, note 4, s. 25(2)(a).
180. In Saskatchewan, of course, such discretion is absolute. Saskatchewan Act,
supra, note 4, s. 10(1) and Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 17(1).
181. Supra, note 4, s. 12(1)b.
182. Supra, note I s. 17(2).
Pennies from Heaven
the prosecution of alleged offenders is explicitly allowed as a reason
for denial of benefits only in Alberta. 183 An example of a Board
decision placing little weight on an applicant's fear of retaliation is
provided by illustration number two of the "examples of disallowed or
reduced claims" given in the Saskatchewan Board's draft 1984 report.
The applicant in this case received twenty percent less than he would
have otherwise because of his failure to assist the police in the laying
of charges. He had been attending a party when he was assaulted in a
washroom; presumably he knew who his assailant was, but didn't
want to tell the police. The Board obviously feels that persons who do
not assist the police are not as deserving as those who do.
The idea here is that assisting people who do not assist the police
would not serve public policy. However, if the danger of reprisal is a
large one, such a condition may result in justice not being done, as it
may place the needs of the justice system before the needs of the in-
dividual claimant. People may be discouraged from applying for
criminal injuries compensation as a result. A similar situation existed
recently in Ontario where a woman was found to be in contempt of
court and jailed for refusing to testify at her common law spouse's
trial for assault. The assault charge, of course, had been laid because
the woman alleged she had been beaten up; now she was afraid that
she was going to get beaten up again by her common law spouse if
she testified against him.
(ii) The Imprudent Person Principle
This leads to a second category of decisions, those where the Sas-
katchewan Board reduced the compensation awarded to the victim,
but still gave him or her something. In almost every one of these cases
the Board seems to be condemning the applicant's bad judgment. Al-
cohol was sometimes involved, but not to as great an extent as in the
first category of decisions.184Already mentioned was case 1193 in
which the Board reduced its compensation award to the victim of a
sexual assault because she was using illegal drugs at the time of the
assault. This was only one of the reasons given for the Board's reduc-
tion, of course, but it does illustrate the importance of drugs in this
line of cases.
183. Alberta Ac supra, note 4,2. 8(2Xb).
184. These decisions are similar to the Ontario ones listed under "Reduction of
Awards" by Spiegel in his review of the Ontario Board's jurisprudence. Spiegel,
supra, note 22 at 286.
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In case 1112 the applicant voluntarily agreed to fight, and was injured
as a result. His compensation award was reduced by fifty percent.
This happened also in case 1142 when another applicant provoked his
particular assailant by wrongfully accusing him of stealing a woman's
purse. Finally, in case 1175 the board chopped in half the award
which would have otherwise come to a Mr. Klenk because he "... in-
itiated the altercation and refused to conduct himself in an ap-
propriate manner." The principle here appears to be that people who
start fights will at most receive half of what they would if they had
been victims of unprovoked assaults. Like all principles, this one has
exceptions. It is interesting to note the large role assigned to provoca-
tion here. The second relationship I found can be expressed rather
clumsily as the imprudent person principle. It is that:
people who expose themselves to significant risks and are injured
as a result will be deprived of full recovery by reason of their faulty
judgment, although they will probably be awarded over half of
their assessed damages.
For example, the applicant in case 1110 was beaten up by her drunken
boyfriend. The board reduced her award by twenty percent because
she continued to live with him even though she knew him to be
violent when intoxicated. A person who tried to disarm his brother
and was shot in the leg as a result had his award reduced by thirty
percent because "... did not exercise good judgment and deliberately
put himself in hazardous circumstances" in case 1192. Case 1005 in-
volved an application for compensation made after an assault by two
males; the applicant suffered a broken jaw for using his hands in a
suggestive manner.
The reasoning in the above cases seems to be a derivation from the
rules of contributory negligence. These rules have been stated to be of
importance by the chairman of the Saskatchewan Criminial Injuries
Compensation Board.1
85
In this context it is interesting to note that the effect of provocation is
much greater in criminal injuries compensation schemes than it is
either in the criminal or the civil courts.186 In criminal law provoca-
tion may be relevant to a judge's sentencing decision after a finding of
185. L. Savage, "Negligence to be emphasized by board" The Commentator, (Sunday
16 January 1983 [hereinafter Savage].
186. Bums, 186. Saskatchewan Act, supra, note 4, s. 1O(l).supra, note 15 at 362.
Pennies from Heaven
guilt, or it may play the even more limited role of reducing a murder
conviction to one for manslaughter. In tort law the successful pleading
of provocation may only reduce damages.
The role of causation in a criminal injuries compensation scheme has
been commented on in the second section of this article. From the
Saskatchewan Board's point of view an individual may cause his or
her injuries merely by being in a particularly seedy bar while intoxi-
cated. As mentioned earlier, this is using causation in a rather blunt
sense.
In a related category are awards which were reduced because ap-
plicants failed to co-operate with medical authorities (case 1196) or
failed to co-operate with the police by reporting an offence promptly
or within a reasonable time (case 1092). The reasoning involved here
has been discussed earlier. Although the reduction of compensation
under the first head may be justified by the logic of contributbry
negligence, the Saskatchewan Board is only given express statutory
authority to deny the awarding of compensation completely under the
second head. However, as has been noted several times, in Sas-
katchewan the Board has been granted absolute discretion by the
legislature in the making of entitlement decisions.187 In Ontario, of
course, the Board's discretion is not absolute, bdt must be exercised in
accordance with the Act.
188
The Saskatchewan Board does sometimes award compensation for
loss or damage to property, although the property is always of little
value, being clothing or the like. It has been noted that the Board has
no jurisdiction to do so in either Ontario or Saskatchewan. However, it
does not seem objectionable for the Board to state that it is compen-
sating victims for expenses they have already incurred 189 in light of
the small amounts of money involved, and the theoretical problems
involved with excluding compensation for property damages. 190
The Board may also refuse to award any compensation for reasons
which have nothing to do with the worthiness of the victim. This hap-
pens where the applicant has already received full compensation (in
187. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 5.
188. Saskatchewan Ac4 supra, note 4, s. 13(a) and Ontario Act. supra, note 1, s. 7(1)(a).
189. Alberta Ac4 supra, note 4, s. 8(2)(b).
190. See the section of this article entitled "Background", supra, p. 113.
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the Board's eyes) from another source. This occurred in case 1082,
which involved an application for compensation in the context of a
death brought about by the death of the victim's son in a car accident.
I have shown that victims can be defined as dependents under the
Saskatchewan Act, 191 as they can in Ontario as well, given that a death
has occurred as a result of the crime.192 Although it is not explicitly
stated in the case 1082, an award was probably not made because
damages had already been paid under an automobile insurance
policy.
Dependents may be viewed as unworthy because of the actions of the
person who they claim. This is possible even if this person died as a
result of being a victim of a crime. It was developed in part three of
this article how that such an apparently harsh rule may be explained
as an extension of the principle that a person may not benefit from
his or her wrongful act. Only in British Columbia 193 is there express
statutory for such an extension, as was previously mentioned. There
are some examples of this principle in the Saskatchewan Board's draft
1984 annual report. A father was denied compensation for the death of
his son in case 982 because the board found that the son was the per-
petrator of the hostage taking incident in which he died. Compensa-
tion was also denied to the sister of a deceased person in case 1029.
The role of the deceased in his death must have been a large one, for
his assailant was acquitted of murder on the ground of self-defence.
It is interesting to note that the Saskatchewan Board does not appear
to have made many awards to people who were injured while making
citizen's arrests. 194 It did make payment to an individual in case 1000
who was injured when trying to stop several males from assaulting two
teenagers. However, it also reduced compensation to an individual
who had been assaulted after having witnessed the assault of another
person, and as a result of going over and asking a group of people
what was going on. The decision in case 1024 does not seem to en-
courage people to assist in the enforcement of the law, assuming that
this person was going to make a citizen's arrest.
191. Supra, note 4, ss. 2(c), 10(IXI).
192. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, ss. l(l)(c), 5(f).
193. British Columbia Act, supra, note 4, s. 5(b).
194. This is true of the period from April 1, 1983 to the middle of September 1984.
See Report. supra, note 147.
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The Board did make at least two awards in the period covered by its
1984 Annual Report to policemen injured while in the course of
duty. 195 It does not appear that the policeman in either case 1048 or
case 979 were arresting or attempting to arrest anybody at the time
their injuries were caused, although this may have occurred immedi-
ately after their injuries were sustained.
Finally, an examination of the Saskatchewan Board's decisions shows
that conviction of the person who caused the injury or death com-
plained of is not a condition which must be satisfied before compen-
sation is awarded. As mentioned in the Statutory Guidelines section
of this article, this idea is made express in the Ontario legislation;
196 it
has been adopted by the Saskatchewan board in numerous cases,
despite a lack of explicit statutory authority to do so. This occurs most
commonly where the alleged offender has not yet been apprehended,
(case 975) or has not yet been dealt with by criminal court, (case 979).
Of course, in Saskatchewan hearings of the Board must be held in
camera if the person who caused the loss complained of has not been
convicted, or even charged.
197
The Saskatchewan Board sometimes substitutes its judgment for that
of a criminal court, though the degree of proof involved is different
Proof of a compensable event need only be on a balance of prob-
abilities.198 In case 1100 a charge of rape against an accused had been
dismissed, and presumably no other charges against him had been
laid. However, the Board was satisfied that there had been an assault,
and granted compensation. It has been shown earlier that an award
can be made even where the person injured refuses to lay charges.
199
In case 1125 and case 1106 the Board granted compensation even
though the person accused of causing the applicant's loss had died
before he or she could be dealt with by the criminal courts. Finally,
in case 1067 compensation was granted although a stay of proceedings
195. As has been previously noted, such awards are exceedingly rare in Ontario.
Lissamnan, supra, note 24 at 30.
196. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 16(1). See also Skerget, supra, note 90.
197. Saskatchewan Act, supra, note 4, s. 16(a-c). See also Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s.
12.
198. This is also the case in Ontario. Lissaman, supra, note 24 at 31.
199. This was illustrated by the case which involved threats of retaliation. See Does
the Board Make Law & The Tavern Principle in this article, just after footnote
182.
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prevented the further criminal prosecution of the person alledged to
have caused the injuries in that case. So the Saskatchewan Board is
moving towards the situation of the Board in Manitoba, the empower-
ing statute of which allows compensation to be awarded even if the
criminal charge connected with the loss suffered has been withdrawn
or dismissed.
JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL INJURIES
COMPENSATION
The picture which emerges from an examination of the decisions of
the Saskatchewan Criminal Injuries Compensation Board is an inter-
esting one from a jurisprudential point of view. The Board does ap-
pear to decide like cases in a similar way. Most awards of the Board
in similar situations fall within certain ranges. Particular principles
and rules appear with regularity in the Board's decisions. For the pur-
poses of this article, it is assumed that an examination of the Ontario
Board's decisions would result in the revelation of much the same pat-
terns. For a consideration of what patterns in decision-making deserve
the adjective legal and therefore whether or not law is being made, I
must turn to jurisprudence. In doing so I will take ideas from systems
of jurisprudence developed by three people: Hart, Dworkin and Mac-
Cormick.200 Before doing so it must be emphasized that these systems
are only separate in the minds of their respective creators. Mac-
Cormick owes much to Hart as well as to Dworkin, for example.
It may be unfair to expect such systems to be of much assistance. Is-
sues involved the reasoning of those with powers of decision granted
under particular statutory schemes have not received much attention
from jurisprudes. Dworkin is typical in this respect; he confines him-
self to situations where judges make decisions of jurisprudential im-
port. This leaves a large gap in the jurisprudence of administrative
tribunals, as Kenneth Culp Davis20 1 points out.
Before starting to determine whether or not the Saskatchewan
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board makes law it is useful to point
200. H.L.S. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961)
[hereinafter Harl. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Bath: Gerald
Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1977) [hereinafter Dworkin]. MacCormick, Legal Reason-
ing and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) c. 9 [hereinafter
MacCormick.
201. see Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969) [hereinafter Davis].
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out that nearly all systems of reasoning contain some notion of prece-
dent. This concept is not the property of jurisprudential thinkers; as
what has happened before is always relevant to what will happen next,
unless the world is a random place.
MacCormick would probably agree with Dworkin that a concept basic
to law is "the fairness of treating like cases alike."
202
So would most clients of legal clinics who know someone else who has
received a benefit that they are after. It follows that cases should not
be decided in an arbitrary fashion, as legal reasoning in this context
involves "the rational development of general policies or prin-
ciples."20 3 Although Dworkin recognizes the importance of precedent
when questions of principle are involved, he does not make a place for
it when issues of policy are being decided. His difficult definition of
policy involves the attainment of social or collective goals, such as
economic efficiency, by the payment of money to one party or
another.2°4 According to Dworkin, even judges shouldn't have to
decide similar cases in the same way when policies are involved, al-
though Dworkin may be using the word policy in a unique sense.
It has earlier been shown that the Ontario legislature views a tribunal
rather than a court as the appropriate place for decisions concerning
criminal injuries compensation to be made. Perhaps the role of prece-
dent ought not to be as great in proceedings involving a statutory
power of decision as it is when judges are involved. The legislature ap-
pears to have chosen to solve problems of entitlement to criminal in-
juries compensation in a quick and inexpensive way.205 However,
from what has been written earlier, it follows that precedent should at
least be relevant to situations like those considered by the Ontario
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. Precedent can be seen as a
way of making sense of decisions because it does boil down to an
assertion that decisions should be made in a rational way.
202. Dworkin, supra, note 200 at 113.
203. J. Claydon & J. Galloway, Law and Legality. Materials on Legal Decision Making
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 12-17.
204. Dworkin, supra, note 200 at 22.
205. Grossman, supra, note 24 at 380.
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Dworkin gives the concept of rights a central place in his system of
jurisprudence.206 His purpose in developing the concept appears to be
to limit the power of judges to make law on their own, although legis-
latures can take away rights. Dworkin has been criticised for failing to
state exactly what rights are;207 his definition of them seems to em-
phasize the substantive rather than the procedural. Rights from either
point of view do not abound when the position of an applicant before
either the Saskatchewan or Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation
Boards.
A reading of the Ontario legislation reveals that two rights may exist
in the context of criminal injuries compensation; a right to apply for
compensation, and the right to have a hearing at which entitlement to
compensation is determined. I could find no Saskatchewan court cases
in which the existence of these two rights was considered but two On-
tario court decisions have been reported. In passing it should be noted
that the first chairman of the Saskatchewan Board is of the opinion
that an applicant for compensation is entitled to be heard. 208
In Sheehan209 the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that
"The applicant has, under this legislation, no right to compensa-
tion, his right being limited to making an application therefor to
the Board."210
This is somewhat narrower than a right to be heard, but at least con-
stitutes an explicit recognition of a right to apply for compensation.
However, that a right to a hearing exists in certain circumstances can
be drawn from the decision of the Ontario Divisional Court in Dar-
ling.2 11
In Darling, an application for compensation had been submitted to the
Board after the time set out for doing so under the Ontario statute had
expired. This was because the lawyer who was supposed to be helping
206. His book is, after all, titled 'Taking Rights Seriously." See Dworkin, supra,
note 200.
207. One of his critics in this regard is MacCormick, see MacCormick, supra, note
200.
208. Eremko, supra, note 82 at 265.
209. Supra, note 53. This is still the case. See Manson, supra, note 33 at 8.
210. Sheehan, supra, note 53 at 769.
211. Supra, note 103.
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Mr. Darling failed to do so. However, when someone at the Ontario
Board sent a letter to Mr. Darling indicating that his application
would not be considered because it came too late, an application form
for compensation was inadvertently enclosed with the letter. The Court
found that since the Board had invited Mr. Darling to apply for com-
pensation by sending him an application form it could not deny Mr.
Darling a hearing, and directed it to hold one.
It is unclear whether or not the court would have been so helpful had
the Board not sent out the application form to Mr. Darling. However,
it did hold that a hearing was required "... if the Board invited an
application 212 which conclusion it reached by analyzing the wording
of the Ontario Statute. Sections 5 and 6 of the Ontario Act213 combine
to invite applications for compensation from victims of crime within a
period of one year from the time the loss was sustained. Section 9(1) of
the Ontario Act214 requires the Board to set a time and a date for the
hearing of an application upon the receipt of an application for com-
pensation.
The above cases may make it too easy to dismiss a Dworkinian system
of jurisprudence. Perhaps the Board recognizes, in effect, that people
in certain situations have rights to compensation, because it always
awards compensation to them. Perhaps it would be possible to ex-
amine the decisions of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Boards of
Ontario or Saskatchewan and to see such a right developing. However,
such an approach would not be supported by any of the authors who
have written in this area, nor by any of the few judgments which con-
sider this issue. Also, rights are of little use to applicants unless they
are made explicit. This point will be developed further when the think-
ing of Kenneth Culp Davis is discussed.
Two barriers stand in the way of a useful application of Dworkinian
jurisprudence to the decisions of either the Saskatchewan or the On-
tario Criminal Injuries Compensation Board. The first involves the
traditional emphasis on problems involving judges and courts. The
second relates to the difficulty of applying a system in which rights
have primacy to a situation in which potential recipients only have a
right to apply for compensation, and then to be heard only if they
have done so soon enough.
212. Darling, supra, note 103 at 769.
213. Supra, note 1.
214. Abid.
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Other systems of jurisprudence do not accord rights such a central
place. In fact, Hart develops a system in which the concept does not
appear. This is a result of his membership in the positivistic school of
legal thinking, members of which separate the descriptive from the
prescriptive in their analysis of law.
Hart, like Dworkin, may be criticized for concentrating on the
decisions of judges to the exclusion of everyone else, but he does make
a place for discretion in his jurisprudence. Law is "open textured" ac-
cording to Hart, which is to say that certain areas of uncertainty are
left open.215 What is more, it would not be desirable for a legislature
to pass laws of complete certainty because "we are men, not gods."
216
Legislatures cannot predict all of the fact situations to which a par-
ticular law might apply, nor are they completely certain of their objec-
tives in passing laws. Judges must therefore choose between competing
legal interests when they decide difficult cases. In doing so, Hart
opines, they must balance the need for the law to be certain with the
need for it to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate new develop-
ments.
Perhaps, on the other hand, the Saskatchewan and Ontario legisla-
tures deliberately set the Board free to establish a completely separate
body of victim of crime compensation law, because it would have been
undesirable or impossible to tell the board what to do in all situations
which now face it.
Unfortunately, Hart's analysis fails to be useful in at least one impor-
tant respect. It seems rather unrealistic. For example, is deciding how
much money to award someone who has been assaulted a decision
which requires a consideration of competing legal interests? Also, it
does not seem that the legislatures of either Saskatchewan or Ontario
intended to throw out all of the law relating to compensation for in-
juries when they passed their criminal injuries compensation aActs. In
an earlier section of this article the background to the Saskatchewan
Act and decisions made under it were examined. It was concluded that
criminal injuries compensation in Saskatchewan can best be under-
stood as a welfare scheme. If a person assaulted in the previous ex-
ample was blind drunk in a bar at the time, worthiness would be the
dominant factor in the Board's compensation decision.
215. Hart, supra, note 200 at 124.
216. Ibid. at 125.
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The concept of worthiness does not explain how criminal injuries
compensation boards decide difficult or new cases, perhaps because it
doesn't realistically attempt to answer the question of how the board
ought to reason. For example, in Saskatchewan Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board case 1030 the applicant was fishing from a canoe
when he was shot by someone who mistook him for a moose. Should
compensation be payable?
Perhaps a more complete theory lies in a positivistic system of
jurisprudence which places importance on the law as it ought to be.
MacCormick has developed a system of jurisprudence which can be
so described. He credits Dworkin for pointing out that positivists like
Hart concentrate too much on one type of legal standards, but insists
that as long as a conceptual distinction is kept between the "...
description of the legal system as it is and a normative education of
the law as it is so described, '217 legal principles can be used as con-
cepts in jurisprudence. MacCormick suggests that courts take into ac-
count legal principles when they take into account community
consensus on social values.
MacCormick agrees with Dworkin that judges do not have a strong
discretion. However, unlike Dworkin, MacCormick does see areas
which require some quite independent legal thofight He acknowledges
the presence of an "inexhaustively residual area of pure practical
agreement"218 where there is no right answer, and holds that judges
must rely on their discretion to make decisions which fall within this
area. MacCormick's analysis develops into something considerably
more complex than does the Hartian conception of "open texture," al-
though both jurisprudes state that judges must use their discretion in
this context MacCormick states that judges make such decisions by
framing possible judgments suggested by principle, and then using a
limited discretion to choose the appropriate one. The consequences of
each possible judgment must be considered, and the decision chosen
must be consistent with previous decisions as well as being a coherent
expression of the relevant principle. This complex theory of precedent
and discretion describes an incremental process, as judges are "...
cribbed, cabined and confined in the exercise of the great powers they
hold."219
217. MacCormick, supra, note 200 at 240.
218. Ibid.
219. Ibid. at 251.
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Like Hartian jurisprudence, this system works fairly well when applied
to an understanding of how the Board decides simple cases. It is better
than a Hartian system when more difficult decisions are sought to be
understood, for it can explain how social values are brought into play.
If specified with sufficient rigour, and separated from a description of
the law, these values can assist analysis.
Earlier in this section the case of the man in the canoe being mistaken
for a moose and shot by a hunter was discussed. Compensation was
denied by the Saskatchewan Board in case 1030. The person who shot
the victim in that case was convicted of using a firearm in a dangerous
manner. The only criminal offences involving firearms for which the
Board is expressly allowed to give compensation are listed in the
schedule to the Saskatchewan Act. Of course, no such schedule forms
part of the legislative scheme in Ontario. It is stated in the Board's
decision that the application was denied because "the applicant was
not a victim of a crime contemplated by the Act", which must mean
that the Board felt a criminal negligence conviction was necessary.
However, had the Board felt that a community consensus on social
values required the payment of compensation, it could have been
awarded on the basis of an act of criminal negligence taking place. It
has earlier been shown that neither the Saskatchewan nor the Ontario
Boards feel themselves bound by criminal court judgments. Compen-
sation has been awarded in Saskatchewan in the absence of a convic-
tion, and even without a charge for an offence listed in the schedule
for the Act being laid. It could be argued that the most important ele-
ments of a criminally negligent act existed here. Perhaps the hunter
had been charged with criminal negligence originally, but for some
technical reason this charge may have been dropped and the new
charge contrary to provincial statute laid 22
The above case is relatively simple, however. There are others which
pose more complicated issues. Before moving on in search of a system
of jurisprudence better suited to an understanding of how the Sas-
katchewan and Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation Board grap-
ples with them, a further point about MacCormick's system of
jurisprudence should be made. Like those propounded by Hart and
220. In case 1100 the Saskatchewan Board was satisfied that all the necessary ele-
nients for assault were present, even though the accused had been neither
charged with this offence nor convicted of it: Report, supra, note 147.
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Dworkin, it was designed to apply to judges, not to people exercising a
statutory power of decision. This emphasis denies it much power in
coming to grips with that central element in administrative decision-
making, discretion.
Discretion has been the subject of much unflattering jurisprudential
analysis. As Dworkin has pointed out, the concept can only be under-
stood in the context in which it appears.221 I would go further, and
suggest that a theory of jurisprudence appropriate to administrative
law, and therefore to criminal injuries compensation Boards, should
allow discretion to play an important and beneficial role. Any scheme
vesting the power to make decisions in administrative tribunals must
do so. Kenneth Culp Davis,2  a legal theorist who is at home in the
world of administrative law, points out that the problem is not with
discretion but with excessive discretion. As he points out "Discretion is
a tool only when properly used; like an axe it can be a weapon for
mayhem or murder."22
3
Davis suggests a system of jurisprudence which seems to fit persons
exercising statutory powers of decision better than do any of the sys-
tems discussed earlier, perhaps because he has set his mind to the
problems of jurisprudence in the context of administrative law. This
system places great importance on fairness, even when entitlement to
gratuities is being determined, as may be in the case with compensa-
tion for the victims of crime. Davis states that
"... the special need is to eliminate unnecessary discretionary
power, and to discover more ways to confirm, to structure, and to
check discretionary power."
224
One way that fairness can be achieved, Davis suggests, is by stopping
persons with broad discretionary powers from making arbitrary
decisions. In the context of American public hodlsing, Davis notes
that Congress gave local public housing agencies the maximum
amount of responsibility for the administration of public housing, but
apparently did not create the right to decent housing. Furthermore,
regulations made in the Chicago area to establish admissions policy
221. Dworkin, supra, note 200 at 31.
222. Supra, note 201.
223. Ibid. at 25.
224. Ibid. at 42:
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use the concept of undesirability without defining it2 This is a dis-
qualifying term quite similar to the unworthiness concept used by the
Saskatchewan and Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation Boards.
By holding that the Chicago Housing Authority could not act ar-
bitrarily, the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia removed
the Authority's unnecessary discretionary power. The lack of substan-
tive rights on the part of the applicants did not allow them to be
treated unfairly.
Davis describes the growth of consistency in the exercise of discretion
by administrative tribunals. He writes that by "nibbling away" at a
problem and by finding solutions to each "bite" of it, a creative ad-
ministrative tribunal sometimes opens the way for perspective think-
ing, and comprehensive solutions to the whole problem emerge.
2 2 6
This, he points out, is the creation of common law.22 7 When a board
has to write its decision down, Davis opines, the needed confinements
of discretionary power through standards, principles and rules will
develop gradually, by themselves. 2 8 Boards will find it more efficient
to refer to this body of decisions rather than to rethink a question
each time it comes up.
2 29
I have earlier shown that the reasoning of the Saskatchewan and On-
tario Criminal Injuries Compensation Boards is influenced by prece-
dent. The analysis of Kenneth Culp Davis appears to fit this process
better than that of any of the jurisprudes earlier heard from, perhaps
because of the role assigned to discretion by Davis.
Yet the Saskatchewan and Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation
Boards are coy. Nowhere in their decisions do these Boards indicate
that they are relying on precedent. One member of the Saskatchewan
Board has stated, rather unhelpfully, that each case is decided "on its
own merits."230 This is the equivalent of the former chairman of the
225. Davis supra, note 201 at 78.
226. Ibid. at 21.
227. Ibid.
228. Ibid. at 59.
229. Ibid. at 108.
230. This comment was either made by Denis Windels, a vice chairperson of the
Board, in 1983, or Morris Chernesky, Q.C. the current chairperson. Savage,
supra, note 185.
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Ontario Board stating "Every case, of course, must be determined
having regard to its own particular circumstances."231
How else should they be decided? The first chairman of the Sas-
katchewan Board went so far as to indicate that even a full transcript
of the evidence placed before the Board "... would afford little assis-
tance in determining at a later date, the underlying reasons and factors
which motivated the Board. '232 So the Saskatchewan Board is, by its
own account anyway, a black box. The advantages of this to the Board
are obvious, as they are to any provincial government that does not
want to be forced to give money to people through a Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board.
There may be at least one respectable reason for the board's attitude to
precedent. Seeing how this may be so requires a further examination
of the purposes of precedent The most important of these has already
been shown to be ensuring that decisions are made in a rational
fashion. There are other reasons for requiring adherence to precedent,
however.
Dworkin advances two reasons for holding judicial creativity in dis-
favour. Judges should not be able to legislate, not having been elected,
nor should they be allowed to apply new law retroactively. The hostile
attitude of jurisprudes to judges who feel free to make inconsistent
and incoherent case law has already been mentioned. Judges, at least,
are only supposed to be creative in certain ways.
Supporters of the educational theory of precedent theorize that
people's actions are guided by what courts decide. The teaching pur-
pose of precedent has been pointed out by Hart, who has written that
precedent is "the communication or teaching of standards of conduct
by example."233 Clearly, if new law is applied retroactively by decision
makers, then this purpose is thwarted. However, the applicability of
this idea breaks down when a concrete example in the context of
criminal injuries compensation is sought, except if there is a real pos-
sibility of subrogation. It has earlier been shown that this is rare, given
the assets and incomes of most of the people who make others the vic-
tims of crime.
231. Grossman, supra, note 24 at 375.
232. Eremko, supra, note 82 at 273.
233. Hart, supra, note 200 at 375.
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It is obvious that people will always try to avoid being injured or
killed as a result of crime. This is true regardless of whether or not
compensation will be awarded by a criminal injuries compensation
board.234 Also, people are unlikely to expose themselves to risk by as-
sisting a police officer in the arrest of an offender or by doing so
themselves just because of the existence of a compensation scheme.
Precedent has no teaching role here, although the educational purpose
of precedent is relevant to many other areas of human endeavour. A
person might think twice about driving home in an intoxicated condi-
tion, for example, given how severely courts have started to fine im-
paired drivers,235 and how large personal injury awards have become
relatively recently.236
Although the picture created by a jurisprudential analysis of the Sas-
katchewan Criminal Injuries Compensation Board is far from clear,
such an analysis makes it possible to understand better what exactly
the Board is doing. The Board apparently doesn't feel under an obliga-
tion to be understood by anyone, but this may be largely a defensive
posture. The success of this attempt to avoid interference, or what is
perceived as such, is the subject of the next section of this paper.
IS THE BOARD SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW?
Judicial review has successfully been applied for on several occasions
in the context of the Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board.237 Cases in which Ontario Board decisions have been appealed
must also be considered.238 Most compensation board decisions in
Canada are made in Ontario, but there are some relevant reported
cases involving appeals and judicial review from other provinces as
234. Kirkham, supra, note 83 at 8.
235. Fines for contravening what used to be ss. 234 or 236 [now ss. 250 and 2521 of
the Criminal Code R.S.C. 1970 c. C-34 have increased in the past from an
average of $200 to an average of $500 in Ottawa, Ontario.
236. The million dollar mark in damages awards thought to have been set by the
Supreme Court of Canada has recently been surpassed by Ontario Courts.
237. Dalton, supra, note 52; Darling, supra, note 211; and Fregeau, supra, note 104.
238. See Batic, supra, note 126 and Manson, supra, note 33.
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well. 239 It will be recalled that the Ontario privative clause is very
strict. An appeal is only explicitly made possible on questions of law
in Ontario.240 Before such a step is considered, the internal decision
review process which the Ontario statute allows ought to be exhausted
and an application to vary the order in question ought to be con-
sidered.2 41
Procedural justice may be the most that an applicant appearing before
the Ontario Board can expect. It was seen earlier that in Ontario per-
sons who make an application for compensation within the proper
time period are entitled to a hearing. A failure on the Board's part to
grant a hearing will lead to judicial review, in spite of the privative
clause.
Challenges to a Board's decision on the basis that the decision was
not arrived at in a way authorized by law would probably also be suc-
cessful. For example, a decision made only on the basis of documen-
tary evidence by the Ontario Board would probably be overturned if a
hearing had been requested by the applicant.242
Under the Saskatchewan Act243 a quorum of the Board is necessary to
make an entitlement decision. A single member of the Saskatchewan
Board who made an entitlement decision- would be acting without
239. Budd v. Minister of Justice (1978), 23 N.B.R. (2d) 421 (N.B.S.C. A.D.), Brittany v.
Province of New Brunswick (1976), 13 N.B.R. 507 (N.B.S.C. A.D.), Re Castel and
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1978), 89 D.L.R. (3d) 72 (Man. CA.), Re
Flynn and Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1988), 49 D.L.R. (4th) 619
(N.S.S.C. A.D.), McKinnon v. Province of New Brunswick (1979), 25 N.B.R. (2d)
421 (N.B.S.C. A.D.), Poholko v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, (1983), 58
N.S.R. (2d) 15 (N.S.S.C. A.D.), Sivret v. Minister of Justice (1984), 54 N.B.R. (2d)
327 (N.B.S.C. A.D.), and Re Willier and Crimes Compensation Board (1977), 75
D.L.R. 728 (Alta. CA.), Re Minister of Justice for New Brunswick and Lewis (1975),
57 D.L.R. (3d) 638 (N.B.S.C. A.D.), Re Morris and Attorney-General for New
Brunswick (1975), 63 D.LR. (3d) 337 (N.B.S.C. AD.).
240. Ontario Act. supra, note 1, s. 23.
241. Ibid. ss. 10)(1), 25. According to Grossman, the effect of the variation provision
contained in Section 25 is that a file is never closed at the Board. Grossman,
supra, note 24 at 379. A similar review is available in British Columbia. British
Columbia Act, supra, note 4, s. 22.
242. The attack would be based on sections 9 & 10 of the Ontario statute. Ontario
Act, supra, note 1.
243. Supra, note 4, s. 5(1).
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jurisdiction in the opinion of the first chairman of the Saskatchewan
Board.244
In Dalton,2 45 which was decided subsequently to Sheehan,246 the court
considered further what is meant by acting capriciously or arbitrarily
in the context of criminal injuries compensation. The claimant in that
case was not obviously deserving, at least according to the tavern prin-
ciple developed earlier in this paper. She and another female had ac-
cepted first drinks and then a drive home from two men they had met
in a hotel. On what she thought was her way home the claimant had
been pushed out of a rapidly moving van for rejecting sexual advan-
ces. She was severely injured. What did being arbitrary mean here? It
meant, in the court's opinion, failing to consider the severity of Mrs.
Dalton's injuries in determining
"whether it would exercise its discretion to deny the application
completely or whether it would merely rely on her conduct to cut
the award by a suitable percent" 247
This decision is interesting for two reasons. First, it contains an ex-
press approval of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board applying
some sort of calculus of contributory negligence. If Mrs. Dalton had
injured herself only slightly, then a reduction or even denial of com-
pensation would have been appropriate. But Mrs. Dalton was not in-
jured slightly; she spent four months in the hospital and suffered
extensive and lasting injuries. She was permanently rendered in-
capable of walking properly. The second reason the decision is inter-
esting is of greater importance. It is that the calculus of contributory
negligence developed by the Board should not be applied in cases in-
volving serious injuries. To apply such a calculus amounts to an error
of law.
However, even arguments based on procedural justice may be of
limited use when applying for judicial review of, or appealing,
criminal injuries compensation Board decisions. It has earlier been ar-
gued that the criminal injuries compensation scheme of Ontario is
244. Eremko, supra, note 82 at 271.
245. Supra, note 38.
246. Supra, note 53.
247. Dalton, supra, note 38 at 398.
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based on a conception of worthiness.248 Perhaps there is a correspond-
ing desire among judges not to be bothered by disappointed ap-
plicants for compensation who are not seen as being particularly
worthy. Drunken patrons of "notorious" bars who assault bouncers
and then come to the Board for compensation when the bouncers hit
back,249 or victims of armed and intoxicated players in crap games
who are hurt while attempting to help others to collect their debts2 0
fall into such a category. Even in situations where the court may sym-
pathize with the applicant it may refuse to find a way to overrule a
denial of criminal injuries compensation.
251
A court faced with an obviously deserving applicant may be willing to
intervene, as the Ontario Divisional Court did in Darling252 when an
application to apply for compensation was inadvertently sent out by
the Board after the time for making such applications had expired.
The same court earlier set aside a decision of the Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board in Fregeau.253 Here a fireman injured in a fire
was denied compensation because no insurance fraud conviction aris-
ing out of the fire had been secured. The court found that the two
were unrelated and that the Board had failed to advert to the issue
before it. This was an error of law. Not all situations are have excited
the courts' sympathies in the same way. This was illustrated in
Sheehan,254 where the same court refused to review a compensation
Board decision denying an application for compensation made by
prisoners injured in the Kingston Penitentiary riots of 1971.
One of the rather tenuous grounds for the Ontario Board's denial of
compensation in Sheehan was that the applicant was injured in prison,
and he would not have found himself there had it not been for his
own criminal activity. The Board was either using an extremely remote
248. See the section of this article entitled "Does the Board make Law?", infra, p.
134
249. See Lischka, supra, note 39.
250. See Manson, supra, note 33.
251. For a Saskatchewan case in which this occurred see McPardin v. Crimes Com-
pensaion Boani (Sask) (1987), 37 Sask. Reps. 3 (Sask Q.B.).
252. Supra, note 103.
253. Supra, note 104.
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theory of causation, as the overruled Nova Scotia Criminal Injuries
Compensation Board did in Poholko25 5 or applying the principle
which denies recovery for a wrongful act in an equally loose way. The
court did not leave a way open for the overturning of a compensation
board decision in the future; this would be possible if the board
"didn't act in good faith ' 256 or "acted arbitrarily or capriciously
'25 7
and "failed to observe the principles of natural justice."25
8
Of course, much of administrative law is a search for the meaning be-
hind words like the ones written above. It has been argued that a duty
to exercise fairly discretion given by statute is an essential component
of administrative law, and that an untramelled or unfettered exercise
of discretion conflicts with this essential component 25 9
Canadian law is starting to acquire some conception of due process
since interpretations of the Charter26° often depend heavily on
American case law. This development bodes well for those who seek
judicial review of compensation for victims of crime board decisions.
Whether more frequent review of what such boards do will make them
decide better is, once again, an issue beyond the scope of this article.
In the meantime, however, a court reviev of any decision made by the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board of Ontario is a rather specula-
tive endeavour, but the jurisprudence does provide some encourage-
ment.
The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board cannot ignore its em-
powering Act and decide cases on the basis of whim; it cannot be ar-
bitrary. No administrative tribunal can;261 the only refuge from this
255. Poholko, supra, note 32.
256. Sheehan, supra, note 53 at 734. Sheehan was quoted with approval in Manson,
supra, note 33 at 8.
257. Sheehan, ibid., at 732.
258. Ibid.
259. see Carter, supra, note 61 at 68. This point is also made in Poholko, supra, note
32 at 17.
260. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
261. See A. Roman, "Legal Constraints on Regulatory Tribunals: Vires, Natural Jus-
tice and Fairness" (1983) 9 Queen's L J. 35 at 58.
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argument is to claim that the Board is a kind of Santa Claus, and
makes c gratia payments on behalf of the state.2 62
The Ontario Criminal Injuries Compensation Board must also provide
reasons for its decisions. These reasons must be clear, but a failure to
make them so on the part of the Board will only result in the Board
being penalized for costs when its decisions are appealed. 263
The most fruitful method of of attacking of a Board decision was men-
tioned in the Statutory Guidelines section of this article. It draws
strength from the previously mentioned idea that untramelled and un-
chanelled discretion is contrary to the principles of administrative
law264 but is qualified by the reluctance of courts to interfere with
decisions of the specialized administrative tribunal like the Ontario
Board.2
65
The two-stage method of determining entitlement to criminal injuries
compensation which was mentioned earlier demands that the Board
first consider whether the applicant was injured or killed in an event
causally related to a criminal act. Only when the amount of that order
is considered, in the second stage, can the conduct of the applicant be
considered. If the Board fails to engage in this two-stage process, it has
made an error of law. 66 In Ontario, of course, Board decisions which
contain errors of law may be reviewed.2 67 So may the decisions of any
administrative tribunal anywhere in Canada, Carter argues, in light of
the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Canadian Union of Public
Employees v. New Brunswick Liquor Corporation,2 68 privative clauses
notwithstanding.
262. As is the case in Great Britain, see Murphy, supra, note 23 at 546. Faieta is of
the opinion that awards in Ontario are made on an ex gratia basis. Faieta,
supra, note 24 at 9.
263. See Batic, supra, note 126 at 68.
264. See Dalton, supra, note 38 at 396 and Poholko, supra, note 32 at 18.
265. See Spiegel, supra, note 22 at 296.
266. The analysis here is taken directly from Carter. See Carter, supra, note 61 at
171. It also flows from Poholko, supra, note 32 at 18, Dalton, supra, note 38 at
397 and is impliedly approved by Manson, supra, note 33.
267. Ontario Act, supra, note 1, s. 23.
268. [19791 2 S.C.R. 227 (S.C.C.) cited in Carter, supra, note 61 at 167.
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CONCLUSION
This paper started with a review of the background against which
Ontario's Compensation for Victims of Crime Act must be seen. Compen-
sation schemes in other provinces of Canada were then compared with
the one in Ontario, which helped to explain the factors taken into ac-
count by the Ontario Board when it makes decisions. Jurisprudence
was used to analyze some of the decisions made by the Saskatchewan
Board, which operates under similar legislation, and it was concluded
that law is being made. However, since the purpose of the board may
be similar to that of a welfare agency, the system created may be
without an effective means of judicial review. I concluded by noting
that the future might bring one.
